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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Divorcing parties stipulated to a form of decree that would merge all provisions of a
mediated property division, keeping them subject to modification for materially changed
circumstances in the future. After pro-se husband (appellant here) had signed and handed back
(to wife's attorney) the stipulation for entry of the "attached" form of decree, however, a different
form of decree was substituted and attached to the stipulation for its actual presentation to and
entry by the magistrate. The substituted form of decree deleted the language
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 9,
2007 is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this
decree of divorce and"
from the bottom of the first page, leaving only the following language - at the top of the second
page, which of course lay covered by the first one:
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 9,
2007 is hereby merged and incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for
Paragraph L which is not merged and shall remain a separate contract between
the parties."
"Paragraph L" was a spousal support provision pursuant to which husband paid wife some
$93,000 over a span of about 42 months, by which time his financial circumstances mirrored the
rest of the economy and he could no longer afford to support his own family and his ex-wife.
When he moved the magistrate to terminate the spousal support obligation for materially
changed circumstances, however, wife's new attorneys successfully urged the second iteration of
paragraph 2 as precluding modification.

Wife then sued in District Court breach of the

supposedly "not merged, separate contract" to pay her $2,200 per month for ten years,
whereupon she was granted summary judgment.
3

Course of proceedings and disposition below.
Divorcing couple successfully submitted their property division and child custody issues
to mediation, yielding an eleven-page Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement
Agreement ("mediated agreement") that included a spousal support provision ("Paragraph L")
benefitting wife. Thereupon, the office of wife's then-attorney presented appellant husband (who
was pro se) with a stipulation for entry of judgment and decree of divorce
"... in the form attached to this Stipulation."
Empnasis added. (C.R. 177) As reflected both in the wife's own affidavit in support of summary
judgment (C.R. 105-128) and in husband's affidavit in opposition (C.R. 129-138), the "form
attached" to the stipulation presented to, signed and handed back by the pro-se husband included
the following at the very bottom of its first of two pages:
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 9,
2007 is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this
decree of divorce and"
(C.R. 108 and

136; Appendix A hereto for convenience.) The "form" submitted by wife's

counsel to the magistrate for entry, however, was not the above form

to which husband had in

fact stipulated - but a very different one (C.R. 175), attached as Appendix B.

In this "form,"

the masthead of counsel has been moved down the page several lines, resulting in the total
elimination of the "approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this decree of
divorce" language, leaving in place - on the second page - only the paragraph that read:
"2. MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March 9,
2007 is hereby merged and incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for
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Paragraph L which is not merged and shall remain a separate contract between
the parties. "

C.R. 175-176, emphasis added.

It was this changed "form" - rather than the form that was attached to the stipulation when
husband signed it - that wife's counsel submitted to the magistrate and the magistrate entered.
C.R.175-176; 129-138.
Husband had paid wife over $90,000 pursuant to the spousal support provision of the
mediated agreement when competition and the economy rendered him unable to continue the
$2,200 per month payments, and he quit making them. Wife (by then pro se as well) filed a
"complaint" in the divorce case (CV DR 06-13448) for the arrearages and husband responded
with a motion to terminate any further obligation for spousal support on the ground wife had
remarried and he was financially unable to make further support payment in any event. Wife
retained new (current) counsel, who voluntarily dismissed her pro se complaint. The magistrate
denied husband's motion to terminate spousal support, concluding per the "stipulation," the
support provision was not merged in the decree and that the court therefore no longer had
jurisdiction to consider modification for changed circumstances. (C.R. 174, 181-183). Plaintiff
wife then filed the instant suit in District Court as a separate action for breach of the putative
"separate" contract.
Wife then moved for summary judgment on the ground the support provision was not
merged in the divorce decree and thus was not susceptible to modification for changed
circumstances. Husband opposed the motion on the ground the form of "judgment and decree of
divorce" to which he had truly stipulated made the entire mediated agreement (including its
spousal support provision) "an integral and non-separable" part of (i.e., was merged in) the
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decree and thus there was no meeting of the minds as to any "agreement" to entry of a form of
decree that would carve off the spousal support provision to render it impervious to modification
for materially changed circumstances.

Affidavit of Joseph L. Soelberg in Opposition to

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, C. R. 129-138.
Despite husband's affidavit and its inclusion (as Exhibit A and Exhibit B) of the two
different "forms" of decree; and despite husband's explanation of the fact Exhibit A was what
was attached to the stipulation when he signed it, whereas Exhibit B was what wife's counsel
presented to the magistrate for entry (and which the magistrate did enter); and despite the fact
even wife's own affidavit in support of summary judgment likewise adopted Appendix A and not
Appendix B (C.R. 106, paragraph 4 and C.R. 108), the District Court nonetheless granted wife
summary judgment, stating in its Memorandum Decision and Order at 3:
Soelberg does not address in his affidavit the Stipulation he signed in 2007 with
the attached form that reads exactly as the Divorce Decree entered in 2007.
C.R. 188. But Soelberg does address in his affidavit the Stipulation he signed in 2007 and he
also addresses why the form attached to the stipulation by the time it was filed by wife's attorneys
does indeed read "exactly as the divorce decree entered in 2007": It reads the same because the

form filed with the stipulation and presented to the magistrate for entry wasn't the same form
as was attached to the stipulation when husband signed it. And nowhere did the District Court
address the fact that even wife's own affidavit in support of summary judgment also reflects the
switch (C.R. 108).
Defendant husband elected to file his notice of appeal shortly thereafter (C.R. 200-203),
which became effective upon the District Court's February 7, 2012 entry of judgment (C.R. 204205).
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Statement of Facts
Inasmuch as this is an appeal from summary judgment for plaintiff wife, husband here
cannibalizes the facts from his affidavit in opposition to plaintiffs motion therefor (C.R. 129138):
During the parties' marriage, they acquired, as community property, two residences in
which they had, at the time of their mediated divorce, equity of $66,000 and $72,000,
respectively - a difference of just $6,000.

They

also

acquired,

as

community property,

businesses that included an income-producing one known as The Litigation Document Group of
Boise, LLC ("Litigation Document Group"), together with attendant business debt of
approximately a million dollars and another business known as Las Vegas Legal Technologies,
LLC, together with its attendant business debt of another roughly a half-million dollars.
As reflected in the "Property and Debt Schedule" that was part of the agreement
(C.R. 119-120), the parties each received a distribution of one of the residences, with husband
receiving the one with the greater equity - by a mere $6,000. In addition to the house with the
$6,000 greater equity, husband also received the two businesses, but only with their attendant
debt of fully $1,500,000. The parties were divorced in March of 2007. Husband's income for
the last full year preceding the divorce, i.e., 2006, was $103,728. The provision for "spousal
support" quoted by plaintiff in her complaint (i.e., $264,000 over a 10-year period) was intended
by the parties to equalize her community property interest in what were, at the time of the
agreement, seemingly solid, income-producing businesses.

Those businesses were the sole

sources of husband's income.
At all times throughout the parties' divorce proceedings, wife was represented by
attorney Stanley W. Welsh, whereas husband, who has no legal training, was unrepresented. At
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no time did plaintiff or her then attorney call to husband's attention the fact Welsh had inserted
language into the proposed Judgment and Decree of Divorce that would differ from the mediated
agreement by stating "The Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 2007 is hereby merged and
incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for Paragraph L which is not merged and shall

remain a separate contract between the parties." Emphasis added. Moreover, at no time did
plaintiff or Welsh call to husband's attention any purpose they had to insert that language in
order to prevent the divorce court from later reviewing the "spousal support" part of the parties'
mediated agreement in light of future changed circumstances.
The Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement into which the parties
entered purported, and was intended by them, to resolve all of the issues between them, including
the division of their community property and the custody, visitation and support of their two then
minor children.

Husband understood, based on everything said by the plaintiff, by her attorney

and by the mediator, that the entirety of the parties' Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement
Agreement would be made effective by submittal to the divorce court for "adopting" in a
judgment or decree. Review of the mediated agreement itself discloses it contains no provision
whatsoever that would distinguish "Paragraph L" from the parties' intent for the entire agreement
to be adopted by (i.e., merged in) the decree. (C.R.110-120)
When Welsh's assistant presented husband with the stipulation for entry of the judgment
and decree, she only said something about his addition in the form of the judgment and decree of
some "minor" language to what was in the actual mediated agreement, which husband
understood to mean some legal formality that would not affect in any way the substance or effect
of what he had just agreed to in the mediation. Husband signed the proffered stipulation and
gave it back to the assistant.
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Husband believes the first page of the form of judgment and decree he was shown by
Welsh's assistant when they sought his stipulation to its entry by the divorce court was the same
one plaintiff herself attached as Exhibit 1 to her affidavit in support of summary judgment and it
included, on its first page, the following:
"2.
MEDIATION AGREEMENT:
The Mediation Agreement dated
March 9, 2007 is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part
of this decree of divorce and"
(C.R. 108; 136; Appendix A) Husband does not recall whether the second page of the judgment
form included the balance of the carry-over sentence at the bottom of its page one, but he
distinctly remembers "knowing" that the entirety of the parties' Mediated Parenting and Property
Settlement Agreement was to be approved by the divorce court and "made an integral and nonseparable part of [the] decree of divorce," which was their whole purpose in submitting to
mediation at all.
Nothing in what was said to husband by Welsh's assistant and nothing in the stipulation
for entry of the judgment and decree called to his attention the fact that the form of judgment and
decree Welsh had drawn and would present to the divorce court for entry carved off an exception
to merger for the "spousal support" provision of the mediated agreement. Moreover, as set forth
above, the first page of the judgment form with which husband was presented stated,
specifically, that "the Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 2007 [i.e., all of it] is hereby
approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this decree of divorce and," which
conformed to what husband's understanding was all along.
In truth and in fact, however, the form of judgment and decree Welsh had drawn and
would present to the divorce court for entry, and which in fact the divorce court did enter, is the
one appended hereto as Appendix B. It differs materially from the form that was attached to the
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proffered stipulation when husband signed it in that it deleted the language at the bottom of its
first page (quoted above) and included at the top of its second page the following:
"2.
MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March
9, 2007 is hereby merged and incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for
Paragraph L which is not merged and shall remain a separate contract between
the parties."
Emphasis added.

It must be noted that husband does not recall whether the provision just

quoted was also in the form of judgment and decree Welsh's assistant presented to him (the first
page of which is Appendix A hereto), but he does know he did not notice it or attach any
significance to it if it was. Husband believes and urges this is reasonable and understandable in
view of the language with which the first page concluded, i.e., " the Mediation Agreement dated
March 9, 2007 [i.e., all of it] is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part

of this decree of divorce and".
Husband thought everything about plaintiffs and his divorce, including any necessary
future modifications of it, would be handled in the divorce court, and that everything in the
parties' Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement was to be confirmed and
adopted by the divorce court's Judgment and Decree. Husband did not notice, understand the
legal import of or attach any significance to the fact Welsh had, in the form of judgment and
decree he submitted to the divorce court for entry, carved off an "exception" against merger of
paragraph "L" - and only paragraph L - of the Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement
Agreement which, although not identified or described in any way, was the subject provision for
spousal support. The judgment and decree drawn by Welsh and submitted to the divorce court
for its entry, and which was in fact entered, is Appendix B.
Since the parties' divorce in March 2007, both of the litigation-related businesses
received by husband pursuant to the mediated agreement have failed and dissolved, and
10

Litigation Document Group received a Chapter 7 discharge of its debts in bankruptcy. Other than
the discharge of Litigation Document Group's debts, husband received nothing of value for his
ownership thereof. He continued to make payments on the business debt of the other business,
although it, too, has closed its doors and is dissolved. At or about the time of the parties' divorce,
husband started a third business, known as Data One, LLC in Boise, the primary product of
which was to be the provision of records scanning and archival, along with copying. Since
husband's post-divorce formation of Data One, LLC, five competitors have entered the Boise
market for provision of the same services, nearly eliminating its profitability. It has downsized
from a business employing five or six salaried employees to just one. It is husband's sole source
of income.
Plaintiff was remarried on October 10,2010, and husband has likewise remarried.
As the result of the collapse of Litigation Document Group of Boise, LLC and Las Vegas Legal
Technologies, LLC, coupled with the entry of so many competitors into the market for Data
One's goods and services, husband is struggling to provide necessaries for his own family,
whereas the businesses he received as the consideration for the subject spousal support provision
have proved entirely worthless. Husband has already paid to plaintiff the sum of at least $93,100
pursuant to the subject "spousal support" provision

a sum that exceeds by some $87,000 what

was distributed to him in what was understood and intended by both parties to be a roughly
equal distribution of the community property.

Husband's total income for 2011 through

November was just $31,193 or less than one-third of what his annual income was when the
parties entered into the "spousal support" agreement on which wife sues - in District Court, as a
"separate contract".
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Enforcement of the "spousal support" prOVISIOn plaintiff sues on works an
extreme hardship on husband and on his family due to the unforeseeable failure of the businesses
it was the intent of the agreement to "equalize" by means of the payments to plaintiff wife. For
that reason, he wants the opportunity to persuade the divorce court, if he can, to terminate the
spousal support provision "Paragraph L" due to his materially changed circumstances and the
prevailing equities.

Because he never had any intent to treat the spousal support provision

differently that any other provision of the mediated agreement as respects its merger in the
decree (and thus its amenability to continuing review and modification as justice might require),
the District Court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that he so agreed. Genuine issues of
material fact preclude that finding .. Because the intent of Idaho's community property scheme is
to maintain a more-or-less equal balance between both spouses in the event of divorce; because
the "spousal support" provision set forth in paragraph L of the Mediated Parenting and Property
Settlement Agreement has already yielded an $87,000 bonus to plaintiff and because the true
value of the businesses defendant received has turned out to be wholly illusory, the lower court's
award of summary judgment to plaintiff wife should be reversed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Whether genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for plaintiff

2.

Whether the parties' mediated agreement - in its entirety

wife.
was merged in the

decree and is subject to the divorce court's review and modification for changed circumstances.
3.

Whether the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
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4.

Whether the mediated agreement discloses any intent for internal integration and

if not, whether the agreement evidences any contractual consideration for husband's spousal
support obligation.
5.

Whether husband's material change in his financial circumstances would support

termination by the divorce court of any obligation for spousal support, given a void of any
evidence that plaintiff isn't perfectly capable of earning a living to support herself.
6.

Whether the District Court erred in its award of attorney fees to plaintiff wife.

ARGUMENT

1.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for plaintiff.
It is axiomatic that a genuine issue of material fact is fatal to a motion for summary

judgment:
The requirements of Rule 56(e) are intended to provide the trial court with
sworn factual statements based on personal knowledge that are intended to be put
on as evidence at trial. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a verified
complaint alone may meet the requirements of Rule 56(e). Camp v. Jiminez, 107
Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App.l984). While this Court has never had the
opportunity [to] address whether a verified complaint alone meets the
requirements of Rule 56(e), we hold that the heirs met and satisfied the
requirements of the rule when they relied on their depositions, in addition to, the
sworn contents of the verified amended complaint and the numerous exhibits
attached thereto. As long as the non-moving party relies on statements that are
based on personal knowledge and which would be admissible as evidence at trial
and does more than rest on mere allegations or denials in his pleading, it will be
considered sufficient to comply with Rule 56(e). See LR.C.P. 56(e).
Even if the district court had been correct in concluding that Rule 56(e)
required the heirs to submit affidavits or evidentiary matter other than those relied
upon by the moving party, the requirements of Rule 56(e) would have been met
for an even more fundamental reason. In Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92
Idaho 306, 442 P .2d 442 (1968), the respondent sought to uphold the trial court's
order by charging that the appellant had not complied with Rule 56( e) because of
failure to submit affidavits in response to the motion. In Turner, we approved of
13

the Federal Advisory Committee explanation of the identical Federal rule and
quoted the Committee saying: "Where the evidentiary matter in support of the
motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must
be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented." Central Idaho
Agency, 92 Idaho at 310,442 P.2d at 446.
This explanation follows directly from LR.C.P. 56(e) because even without an
affidavit or other "opposing evidentiary matter" presented by the non-moving
party, summary jUdgment will not be "appropriate," as that term should be
understood in the last sentence of Rule 56(e), if the motion for summary judgment
fails to eliminate all genuine issues of material fact. Thus, assuming that the
original pleadings raise genuine issues of material fact, Rule 56(e) indicates that
the non-moving party is only required to counter the assertions made by the
movant, by tendering affidavits, depositions, or other sworn statements, if the
motion puts at issue the question of whether material issues of genuine fact
remain. If there are any genuine issues of material fact which remain to be
determined by the trial court after receiving the motion for summary judgment
then by definition summary judgment is not appropriate. LR.C.P. 56(e).
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 770-771, 820 P.2d 360,365 - 366 (1991).

Here, wife bases her campaign for conversion of a modifiable spousal support provision
into a non-modifiable "separate contract" on her sworn assertion that defendant agreed to do so:
"Joseph and I agreed that this provision should be treated like a contract. We
agreed not to merge this provision with the divorce decree. See Exhibit 1
incorporated herewith by reference, a true and correct copy of the parties[']
Judgment and Decree of Divorce."
Affidavit [of plaintiff] in support of motion for summary judgment, paragraph 4 (C.R. 106),
emphasis added; accord, Supplemental affidavit of plaintiff in support of motion for summary
judgment (C.R. 170). She makes this claim despite the fact nothing in the Mediated Parenting
Agreement and Property Settlement suggests any such thing. Moreover, Exhibit 1 to plaintiffs
initial affidavit itself creates an issue of fact as to this assertion because it posits by its own terms
at the bottom of page one the adoption of the agreement as an "integral" and "non-separable"
part of the Judgment and Decree. Finally, defendant's affidavit makes plain the fact he did not
so agree and was in fact "had" by Welsh's inclusion of the "integral" and "non-separable"
14

language at the bottom of the form of judgment and decree with which he was presented for
approval but which Welsh then deleted from the form he would present to the magistrate for
entry:
8.
At all times throughout the plaintiffs and my divorce proceedings, she
was represented by attorney Stanley W. Welsh, whereas I was unrepresented. I
have no legal training.
9.
At no time did plaintiff or her then attorney, Mr. Welsh, call to my
attention the fact Welsh had inserted language into the proposed Judgment and
Decree of Divorce that would differ from the mediated agreement by stating "The
Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 2007 is hereby merged and incorporated
into this decree of divorce, except for Paragraph L which is not merged and shall
remain a separate contract between the parties." Emphasis added. Nor at any
time did plaintiff or Mr. Welsh call to my attention any purpose they had to insert
that language in order to prevent the divorce court from reviewing the "spousal
support" part of our mediated agreement for modification or termination in the
event fairness, equity and justice required it in light of future changed
circumstances.
10.
The Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement into
which plaintiff and I entered purported, and was intended by us, to resolve all of
the issues between us, including the division of our community property and the
custody, visitation and support of our two minor children.
11.
I understood, based on everything said by the plaintiff, by her
attorney Stanley W. Welsh and by the mediator, that the entirety of our Mediated
Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement would be made effective by
submittal to the divorce court for "adopting" in ajudgment or decree.
12.
When attorney Welsh's assistant presented me with the stipulation
for the entry of the judgment and decree, she said something about his addition in
the form of the judgment and decree of some "minor" language to what was in the
actual mediated agreement, which I understood to mean some legal formality that
would not affect in any way the substance or effect of what I had just agreed to in
the mediation.
13.
I believe the first page of the form of judgment and decree I was
shown by Welsh's assistant when they sought my stipulation to its entry by the
divorce court was the same one plaintiff has attached as Exhibit 1 to her affidavit
in support of summary judgment and it included, on its first page, the following:
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"2.
MEDIATION AGREEMENT:
The Mediation Agreement dated
March 9,2007 is hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part
of this decree of divorce and"
A true and correct copy is attached hereto for the convenience of the Court
as Exhibit A. [Appendix A hereto.]
14.
I do not now recall whether the second page of the judgment form
included the balance of the carry-over sentence at the bottom of its page one, but I
distinctly remember "knowing" that the entirety of our Mediated Parenting and
Property Settlement Agreement was to be approved by the divorce court and
"made an integral and non-separable part of [the] decree of divorce," which was
our whole purpose in submitting to mediation at all.
15.
Nothing in what was said to me by Welsh's assistant and nothing in
the stipulation for entry of the judgment and decree called to my attention the fact
that the form of judgment and decree Welsh had drawn and would present to the
divorce court for entry carved off an exception to merger for the "spousal support"
provision of the mediated property settlement agreement. Moreover, as set forth
above, the first page of the judgment form with which I was presented stated,
specifically, that "the Mediation Agreement dated March 9, 2007 [i.e., all of it] is
hereby approved and made an integral and non-separable part of this decree of
divorce and," which conformed to what my understanding was all along.
16.
In fact the form of judgment and decree Welsh had drawn and
would present to the divorce court for entry, and which in fact the divorce court
did enter, is attached hereto as Exhibit B. [Appendix B hereto.] It deleted the
language quoted above in paragraph 13 hereof and included on its second page
the following:
"2.
MEDIATION AGREEMENT: The Mediation Agreement dated March
9, 2007 is hereby merged and incorporated into this decree of divorce, except for
Paragraph L which is not merged and shall remain a separate contract between
the parties."
Emphasis added. I do not now recall whether the provision here quoted was also
in the form of judgment and decree Welsh's assistant presented to me (the first
page of which is Exhibit A hereto), but I know I did not notice it or attach any
significance to it if it was. I believe this is reasonable and understandable in view
of the language with which the first page concluded, i.e., " the Mediation
Agreement dated March 9, 2007 [i.e., all of it] is hereby approved and made an
integral and non-separable part of this decree of divorce and".
17.
I thought everything about plaintiff's and my divorce, including
any necessary future modifications of it, would be handled in the divorce court,
and that everything in our Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement
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Agreement was to be confirmed and adopted by the divorce court's Judgment and
Decree.
18.
I did not notice, understand the legal import of or attach any
significance to the fact Welsh had, in the form of judgment and decree he
submitted to the divorce court for entry, carved off an "exception" against merger
of paragraph "L" of the Mediated Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement
which, although not otherwise identified or described, was the subject provision
for spousal support. The judgment and decree drawn by Welsh and submitted to
the divorce court for its entry, and which was in fact entered, is attached hereto as
Exhibit B.

(C.R. 130-133) Accordingly, the major factual premise upon which plaintiffs motion was based
- i.e., that the "spousal support" provision of the Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property
Settlement Agreement should be treated "like" a contract because defendant "agreed" to do so
was directly controverted by husband's affidavit and at least indirectly by plaintiffs own
affidavit, which likewise included Appendix A, not Appendix B.

2.
Idaho law presumes (rebuttably, but only by "clear and convincing
evidence") that (a) the subject spousal support and property settlement agreement is
merged in the decree and (b) the agreement itself is not an "integrated" agreement, such
that (c) there is no longer a contract at all, only the divorce court's ever-modifiable decree.

This case is squarely controlled by Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442, 958 P.2d 599 (1998).
That case very clearly illuminates the somewhat technical but crucial distinction between making
a spousal support and property settlement agreement an "integral" part of the decree, i.e.,

"merged," as here, and the determination whether the agreement itself is "integrated" internally,
which is not the case here. This is no mere matter of semantics, but a fundamental principle of
divorce law.

If the agreement is merged in the decree, as here, then the spousal support

provision is subject to modification or termination by the divorce court - unless it is an
"integrated" agreement, in which case it can't be modified even if merged in the decree. But if it
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is merged and is not an integrated agreement (which is what we have here), then the divorce

court retains continuing jurisdiction to modify or terminate the spousal support provision
whenever changed circumstances warrant it. While somewhat involved, Keeler explains it very
well:
An agreement providing for spousal support payments cannot ordinarily
be modified by the court unless the terms of the agreement were incorporated or
"merged" into the divorce decree. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 102 Idaho 737, 739 n. 6,
639 P.2d 435 n. 6 (1981); Roesbery v. Roesbery, 88 Idaho 514, 521, 401 P.2d 805,
809 (1965); Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 75 Idaho 13,265 P.2d 662 (1954). When
the settlement agreement has been merged into the decree, support provisions in
the agreement may be modified without the mutual consent of the parties because
the agreement has become part of the court's judgment; absent merger, the
agreement stands independent of the decree, and "the obligations imposed under
the agreement are not those imposed by decree but by contract." Bainbridge, 75
Idaho at 24, 265 P.2d at 669. In this case, the magistrate found that the agreement
was merged into the decree of divorce, and that finding is not contested by either
party.
Even where the agreement has been merged into the decree, however,
support terms cannot be judicially modified if the agreement is integrated. A
property settlement and spousal support agreement is integrated "if the parties
have agreed that the provisions relating to division of property and the provisions
relating to support constitute reciprocal consideration [so that the] support
provisions are ... necessarily part and parcel of a division of property." Kimball v.
Kimball, 83 Idaho 12, 17, 356 P.2d 919, 922 (1960). See also Phillips v. Phillips,
93 Idaho 384, 385,462 P.2d 49,50 (1969); Gortsema v. Gortsema, 92 Idaho 684,
688,448 P.2d 777, 781 (1968); Turner v. Turner, 90 Idaho 308, 314, 410 P.2d
648,654 (1966); Roesbery, 88 Idaho at 519, 401 P.2d at 808.
Thus, a court which has been called upon to modify provisions regarding
support must determine whether the parties reached an agreement regarding
integration. This has not proven to be an easy task. In a series of decisions, the
Idaho Supreme Court determined whether property settlement and support
agreements were integrated, focusing primarily upon the terminology used in the
agreements at issue. See, e.g., Gortsema, supra; Roesbery, supra; Kimball, supra.
However, in 1969, by its decision in Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 462 P.2d
49 (1969), the Supreme Court significantly altered the manner in which the
doctrines of integration and merger are to be applied in divorce cases. In
abandoning its previous approach, the Phillips Court observed:
It is our belief that in its attempts to determine the intent of the parties regarding
integration or non-integration of the provisions of separations agreements, this
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Court has been forced to indulge in technical hair splitting. In some cases the
court has held agreements to be integrated ... while in other cases agreements
which were substantially the same but for a word or two have been held to be
non-integrated.

Phillips, 93 Idaho at 386, 462 P.2d at 51 (citations omitted). Taking a new
direction, the Court held that when an agreement for division of property and
support payments has been presented to the divorce court for approval, it will be
rebuttably presumed that the agreement was not integrated and was therefore
subject to judicial mod(fication. The Court stated:
[W]hen parties enter into an agreement of separation in contemplation of divorce
and thereafter the agreement is presented to a district court in which a divorce
action is pending and the court is requested to approve, ratify or confirm the
agreement, certain presumptions arise. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that each provision of such an
agreement is independent of all other provisions and that such agreement is not
integrated; it will be further presumed that the agreement is merged into the
decree of divorce, is enforceable as a part thereof and if necessary may be
modified by the court in the future.

Id. at 387, 462 P.2d at 52. See also Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 115 Idaho 338, 766
P.2d 1219 (1988) (applying the clear and convincing evidence test); Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 102 Idaho 737, 743, 639 P.2d 435, 441 (1981) (Shepard, J., concurring)
(acknowledging the presumption outlined in Phillips ); Phillips v. Dist. Court of
FijthJudicial Dist., 95 Idaho 404, 509 P.2d 1325 (1973) (same).
A rebuttable presumption imposes upon the party against whom it operates the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. Idaho Rule of
Evidence 301. According to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Phillips, that
rebuttal must be made by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the
magistrate found that the evidence of integration did not rise to the level of clear
and convincing evidence and therefore did not rebut the non-integration
presumption. This determination, like other findings of fact regarding the weight
of evidence, must be given deference by this Court unless it is clearly erroneous.
We find no error here, based upon the conflicting evidence presented to the
magistrate.
In her appellate argument, Judith relies heavily upon asserted similarities between
the language in the Keelers' agreement and the agreement involved in Roesbery,
supra, which the Supreme Court found sufficient to establish that the agreement
was integrated. We find this argument inapposite, however, in light of the
Supreme Court's disavowal of the approach utilized in Roesbery and other prePhillips cases which relied heavily upon parsing the language of agreements and
"technical hair splitting." It is sufficient to say that the Keelers' property
settlement and support agreement nowhere clearly and unambiguously expresses
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an intent of the parties regarding integration. We therefore decline to disturb the
magistrate's finding that the Keelers' agreement was not integrated and was
subject to judicial modification.

Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442,444-446,958 P.2d 599, 601 - 603 (Idaho App.,1998), emphasis
added.
3.
The District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case, because the
divorce court by statute has "exclusive" jurisdiction over spousal support.

This issue is determined by application of statutory law:
7-1015. Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify spousal support order
(1) A tribunal of this state issuing a spousal support order consistent with the law
of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support
order throughout the existence of the support obligation.

Because plaintiff did not (and could not, on a duly controverted motion for summary judgment)
overcome the presumption of (a) merger in the decree and (b) non-integration of the spousal
support and property settlement provisions with "clear and convincing" evidence, I.C. § 7-1015
is directly applicable and the tribunal of this state that issued the spousal support order (i.e., the
Judgment and Decree of divorce) had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. The magistrate division
is admittedly a part of the District Court, but the statute clearly operates to preclude what the
plaintiff accomplished below:

she obtained the divorce court's acceptance of a mediated

resolution, only to attempt by a form of shell game to cut off that court's statutory power of
continuing review, thus to preclude its continuing assessment of the controlling equities.
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4.
Even if Paragraph L ("Spousal Support") of the Mediated Parenting Agreement
and Property Settlement Agreement were to be treated "like" a contract, plaintiffs claim
fails because Paragraph L is, on its face, devoid of any requisite consideration.

In her effort to take further advantage of defendant, plaintiff successfully asked the lower
court to treat the following "like" a contract:
Spousal Support:
1.
JOSEPH agrees to pay ANNETTE spousal support in the amount
of $2,200 per month for a period of ten (10) years."
"L.

(C.R. 106; 171; 116) Those tiny few words represent the entire universe of what it is plaintiff
asks this Court to treat "like" a contract.

And inasmuch as a plaintiffs choice of tactic in

litigation is inherently self-serving, it can be taken it as gospel the plaintiff knows full well she
would realize less money if the "Spousal Support" provision were treated as a "spousal support"
provision and thus subject to review in the divorce court for any termination or modification that
might be necessary in light of defendant's woefully changed circumstances. Idaho Code § 71015(1) provides:
A tribunal of this state issuing a spousal support order consistent with the law of
this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support
order throughout the existence of the support obligation.

Having elected to invoke the power of the power of the District Court to treat the spousal support
provision "like" a contract, plaintiff cannot be heard to complain if contract law defeats her
claim.
It does.

In order for a contract to exist, a distinct understanding common to both parties

is necessary. Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 174 P.2d 202 (1946). Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99
Idaho 396, 400, 582 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978). Here, there is a stark issue of fact that defeats
plaintiffs motion: She says, in paragraph 4 of her affidavit, that the parties "agreed" the spousal
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support provision "should be" treated "like" a contract. Defendant, on the other hand, says he
never agreed to any such thing and that he was in fact fooled by Welsh's presentation of the
"dummy" judgment form (Exhibit 1 to plaintiffs affidavit (C.R. 108; Exhibit A to defendant's
affidavit (C.R. 136); Appendix A hereto) that specifically stated the mediated spousal support/
property settlement agreement was to be "made an integral and !l!l!!:..-separable part of this

decree."

Defendant distinctly remembers "knowing" that "the entirety of our Mediated

Parenting and Property Settlement Agreement was to be approved by the divorce court and
'made an integral and non-separable part of [the] decree of divorce,' which was our whole
purpose in submitting to mediation at all." Affidavit of Joseph L. Soelberg, paragraph 14. (C.R.
132) Accordingly, the would-be "contract" on which plaintiff here sues fails because there was
no "distinct understanding common to both parties" that the spousal support provision was to
elevated to some eternal "gotcha" status unique among every other provision of their global
resolution of the issues between them.

In fact, plaintiff fails even to raise a genuine issue of

material fact that would defeat summary judgment for defendant, because there is a legal

presumption in favor of merger into the decree and against integration, which presumption
can be rebutted only by "clear and convincing" evidence:
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, it will be
presumed that each provision of such an agreement is independent of all other
provisions and that such agreement is not integrated; it will be further presumed
that the agreement is merged into the decree of divorce, is enforceable as a part
thereof and if necessary may be modified by the court in the future.

Phillips v. Phillips, 462 P.2d 49,52 (Idaho 1969). See also Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 115 Idaho

338, 766 P.2d 1219 (1988) (applying the clear and convincing evidence test). Nowhere in the
entire Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement is there one single
word to suggest integration or any intent to make its Paragraph L "spousal support" provision
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immune to review by the divorce court for continuing fairness or legitimacy. Plaintiffs hopes
for the success of her counsel's sleight-of-hand must go unrewarded.
Plaintiffs wish to treat Paragraph L "like" a contract fails for another reason, too: To be
enforceable, a contract must be supported by mutual consideration:
The essential elements of a valid contract are: offer, acceptance, and bargained for
consideration. State ex reI. Career Aviation Sales, Inc. v. Cohen, 952 S.W.2d 324,
326 (Mo.App. E.D.1997). The parties must have a mutuality of assent or a
meeting of the minds on these essential terms of a contract. Building Erection
Services Co. v. Plastic Sales & Mfg. Co., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Mo.App.
W.D.2005). The forbearance to enforce a legal right such as filing a lawsuit can
constitute bargained for consideration. See Holt v. Jamieson, 847 S.W.2d 194,
197 (Mo.App. E.D.1993); and Missouri Farmers Ass'n, Inc. v. Barry, 710 S.W.2d
923, 926 (Mo.App. W.D.1986). On the other hand, an expression to gratuitously
do something, which is unsupported by consideration or unaccompanied by
some bargaining, is normally an unenforceable promise. Cash v. Benward, 873
S.W.2d 913,916 (Mo.App. W.D.1994).

Drury v. Missouri Youth Soccer Ass'n, Inc., 259 S.W.3d 558, 574 -575 (Mo. App. 2008),
emphasis added. Here, there is nothing whatsoever in Paragraph L - or anywhere else in the
agreement, either, for that matter - that even purports to constitute "consideration" for
defendant's otherwise gratuitous promise to pay plaintiff post-divorce support. Paragraph L,
entilted "Spousal Support," remains just that:

A spousal support provision in a Mediated

Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement which, lacking either an integration
clause, "clear and convincing evidence" of a mutual intent for integration, or consideration, did

not magically morph into a binding, stand-alone contract as plaintiff contends. It was at all
times simply part and parcel of a mediated divorce agreement that was merged in the decree.
5.
Had plaintiff chosen to maintain her claim in the divorce court, where she
initially brought it, it would have been subject to termination for the extreme hardship it
would now work on defendant.
The parties were divorced over five years ago. Their community property was divided
between them pursuant to a mediated property settlement, more or less equally as required by
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I.e. § 32-712. They have both remarried.

The children, including the son plaintiff transferred

custody of to defendant to facilitate her move to Texas, are no longer minors.
Plaintiff would certainly prefer it if defendant would augment her own Income by
sending her $2,200 each month for another half-decade. Defendant should be relieved cif any
obligation it to do so. He's barely remaining financially afloat himself, and he has a family of his
own to support. He was earning over $100,000 a year when as a pro se divorce litigant he
entered into the subject Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement with
plaintiff. Both of the businesses he received (along with their $1.5 million debt) in the property
settlement have permanently tanked. They were his livelihood. The new business he started has
been hamstrung by the post-2008 economy and a swarm of new competitors. He now makes just
$31,000 per year.
The reason for plaintiffs conscious decision to abandon her claim in divorce court and to
pursue it here is obvious: Any rational, fair-minded magistrate considering and applying the
principles of Title 32, Chapter 7, and I.C. § 32-705 would necessarily conclude plaintiff cannot
establish even the threshold for a maintenance award, i.e., that she "lacks sufficient property to
provide for her reasonable needs and is unable to support herself through employment." See,
Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331, 900 P.2d 807 (Idaho App. 1995):

The 1990 amendments to the statute, however, were meant to eliminate
fault as a prerequisite, relegating it to one of many factors to be considered. The
Statement of Purpose issued by the legislature with the amendment states:
The purpose of this legislation is to remove fault as a requirement for the award
of alimony.

The need of one spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay would
become the primary basis for alimony awards.
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Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331, 334,900 P.2d 807,810 (Idaho App.1995), emphasis added.
This is consistent with the rule in other jurisdictions that provides for termination of spousal
maintenance where necessary to avoid "extreme hardship" and the like to the host spouse. See

Robinson v. Robinson, 674 N.Y.S.2d 921 (N.Y. Sup. 1998); In re Marriage of Carpenter, 677
N.E.2d 463 (Ill. App. 1997); Weber v. Weber, 589 N.W. 2d 358 (N.D. 1999); Jones v. Jones,
651 A. 2d 157 (Pa. Super. 1994); In re Marriage of Maher, 420 N.E. 2d 1144 (Ill. App. 1981),
and cases cited therein; See Compton v. Compton, 612 P. 2d 1175 (Idaho 1980); Harrigan v.

Harrigan, 373 A. 2d 550 (Vt. 1977); Crosetto v. Crosetto, 397 P. 2d 418 (Wash. 1964); Crosby
v.Crosby, 29 S.E. 2d (Va. 1994).
CONCLUSION

The spousal support provision on which plaintiff sues represents one paragraph from a
comprehensive, non-integrated, Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement
Agreement. Idaho law presumes it was intended to be merged in the ensuing decree, such that it
would always remain subject to review by the divorce court for continuing need and fairness.
This presumption can only be overcome by "clear and convincing" evidence, which plaintiff
hasn't shown, nor could she show as any matter of uncontested fact in the face of defendant's
controverting affidavit.
Having made the conscious decision to abandon her chances in divorce court in the hope
of having greater chances in the District Court on a counterfeit "separate contract" regardless of
the merits or equities, plaintiff should be held to have no contract at all, since the universe of
Paragraph L of the Mediated Parenting Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement is devoid
of either consideration to support a separate contract or any clear indication of any intent to treat
it as an integrated agreement.
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Not only did genuine issues of material fact preclude the lower court's entry of summary
judgment for plaintiff, the facts that are not in dispute defeat her claim. Plaintif.[ sues on an

alleged "separate contract" and there simply is no such contract.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of Jun~".<-).

Patrick D. Furey, Attorney at Law
Counsel for defendant-appellant
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